财经论丛 ›› 2023, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (3): 70-81.

• 财务与会计 • 上一篇    下一篇

非国有股东参与治理发挥了“鲶鱼效应”吗?——基于国企战略定位视角

王瑶1, 侯德帅2, 徐道胜3   

  1. 1.中国石油大学(北京)经济管理学院,北京 102249;
    2.首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京 100070;
    3.中国人民大学商学院,北京 100872
  • 收稿日期:2022-01-04 出版日期:2023-03-10 发布日期:2023-03-13
  • 作者简介:王瑶(1995—),女,湖北随州人,中国石油大学(北京)经济管理学院讲师;侯德帅(1985—),男,河南新乡人,首都经济贸易大学会计学院副教授,通信作者;徐道胜(1998—),男,山东聊城人,中国人民大学商学院博士生。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(21YJC630167);中国石油大学(北京)科研基金项目(2462021YJRC019)

Does the Participation of Non-state-owned Shareholders in Governance Play a “Catfish Effect”?From the Perspective of Strategic Positioning of SOEs

WANG Yao1, HOU Deshuai2, XU Daosheng3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China;
    2. School of Accounting, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China;
    3. Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
  • Received:2022-01-04 Online:2023-03-10 Published:2023-03-13

摘要: 优化战略定位、促进高质量发展是国企混改的重要方向。非国有股东作为“内部人”参与国企公司治理,能否发挥“鲶鱼效应”,激发国企活力,更是实践与理论关注的重点。据此,本文从国企战略定位视角,研究发现非国有股东参与治理显著提升了国有企业战略激进度。拓展性分析发现此影响主要存在于地方国有企业以及市场化水平较低地区的国有企业。进一步研究发现非国有股东参与治理主要通过增加研发投入、促进员工流动、降低资本密集度提升了国有企业的战略激进度,并且战略激进度的提升最终有助于增加国企价值。本文研究表明非国有股东参与治理发挥了“鲶鱼效应”,不仅丰富了国企混改经济后果的相关文献,也为继续深入推进国企混改提供了新的证据支持。

关键词: 国有企业, 混合所有制改革, 非国有股东治理, 战略激进度

Abstract: Optimizing strategic positioning and promoting high-quality development is an important direction of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises. Whether the participation of non-state-owned shareholders, as “insiders”, in corporate governance can exert the “catfish effect” and stimulate the vitality of state-owned enterprises is the focus of practice and theory. From the perspective of strategic positioning of state-owned enterprises, this paper finds that the participation of non-state-owned shareholders in governance improves the strategic radicalism of state-owned enterprises. The extended analysis shows that the influence mainly exists in local state-owned enterprises and state-owned enterprises in areas with low marketization level. Further research indicates that non-state-owned shareholders' participation in governance mainly improves the strategic radicalism of state-owned enterprises through increasing R&D investment, promoting employee turnover and reducing capital intensity, and the improvement of strategic radicalism ultimately increases the value of state-owned enterprises. This study shows that non-state-owned shareholders' participation in governance has played a “catfish effect”, which not only enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of the mixed reform, but also provides new evidence support for further promoting the mixed reform of state-owned enterprise.

Key words: State-owned Enterprises, Mixed Ownership Reform, Non-state-owned Shareholders' Governance, Strategic Radicalization

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