政务新媒体、信息摩擦与企业社保缴费

财经论丛 ›› 2024, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (12): 36-46.

政务新媒体、信息摩擦与企业社保缴费

陈祎¹, 陶东杰^1,2, 张耀峰^3,4, 陈政弘¹

1.湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院,湖北武汉 430205;
2.湖北地方税收研究中心,湖北武汉 430205;
3.湖北经济学院统计与数学学院,湖北武汉 430205;
4.湖北经济学院新财经交叉学科研究院,湖北武汉 430205

收稿日期:2024-04-03 出版日期:2024-12-10 发布日期:2024-12-10
通讯作者: 陶东杰(1986—),男,湖北钟祥人,湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院副教授,湖北地方税收研究中心副教授,博士。
作者简介:陈祎(1992—),女,安徽宿松人,湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院讲师,博士;张耀峰(1979—),男,河北承德人,湖北经济学院统计与数学学院、新财经交叉学科研究院教授,博士;陈政弘(1980—),男,台湾新北人,湖北经济学院财政与公共管理学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
教育部人文社科项目(24YJC790019);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72103056);国家社科基金重点项目(23ATJ005)

Government Social Media, Information Frictions, and Corporate Social Security Contributions

CHEN Yi¹, TAO Dongjie^1,2, ZHANG Yaofeng^3,4, CHEN Zhenghong¹

1. School of Finance and Public Administration,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China;
2. Hubei Local Taxation Research Center,Wuhan 430205,China;
3. School of Statistics and Mathematics, Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China;
4. Interdisciplinary Research Institute in New Finance and Economics,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China

Received:2024-04-03 Online:2024-12-10 Published:2024-12-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 有效减少客观存在的信息摩擦是所有税费征缴行动的根本出发点。区别于一般税收征管的研究,本文创新性地构建了一个涵盖征管机构、企业与员工的三方博弈模型,揭示了信息摩擦对企业社保缴费的影响,以及政务新媒体如何通过减少信息摩擦进而促进企业社保缴费。基于我国城市社保政务微博开通的准自然实验和2008—2016年全国税收调查数据,利用双重差分法进行实证检验。研究发现,城市社保政务微博的开通显著提高了企业社保缴费率,且对于民营企业、小微企业、劳动密集型企业的影响更为显著。进一步,社保政务微博信息的传播力、互动性和简便性都会增强其促进企业社保缴费的影响。本文厘清了“征管机构－企业－员工”三方信息互动对企业社保缴费的微观驱动机制,为数字时代如何助推企业社保缴费提供了政策参考。

关键词: 企业社保缴费, 政务新媒体, 信息摩擦, 税费征管, 三方博弈模型

Abstract: Effectively reducing the inherent information friction is the fundamental starting point for all tax collection actions. Distinguished from conventional tax administration studies, this paper innovatively constructs a tripartite game model involving tax authorities, enterprises, and employees, revealing the impact of information frictions on corporate social security contributions, and how government social media can facilitate corporate social security contributions by reducing information frictions. Drawing on a quasi-natural experiment of the opening of city social security department's Sina-microblogs and national tax survey data from 2008 to 2016 in China, empirical tests are conducted using a difference-in-differences approach. The research reveals that the social security department's Sina-microblogs significantly increases the corporate social security contributions, with a more pronounced effect on private enterprises, small and micro enterprises, and labor-intensive enterprises. Furthermore, the communicative power, interactivity, and simplicity of Sina-microblogs enhance its impact on corporate social security contributions. This paper clarifies the micro-level driving mechanism of the trilateral information interaction among “tax authorities-enterprises-employees” on corporate social security contributions, offering policy insights on how to promote corporate social security contributions in the digital era.

Key words: Corporate Social Security Contributions, Government Social Media, Information Frictions, Taxation and Fee Collection, Tripartite Game Model

中图分类号:

F812

陈祎, 陶东杰, 张耀峰, 陈政弘. 政务新媒体、信息摩擦与企业社保缴费[J]. 财经论丛, 2024, 40(12): 36-46.

CHEN Yi, TAO Dongjie, ZHANG Yaofeng, CHEN Zhenghong. Government Social Media, Information Frictions, and Corporate Social Security Contributions[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2024, 40(12): 36-46.

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