关键词: 证券交易所监管, 虹吸效应, 盈余质量, 资源约束

Abstract: This study first constructs a theoretical model to explore how the resource constraint of securities regulation affects the surplus quality of listed companies, and then conducts an empirical test based on the implication of the Stock Exchange Regulation. The results of the study are follows: (1) Despite the regulatory resource constraint, frontline regulation of stock exchanges still has a significant effect on improving the surplus quality of companies with profit-deflating motives; however, the effect of improving the surplus quality of companies with profit-deflating motives is weakened due to the “siphoning effect”. (2) The mechanism test suggests that although the surplus quality improvement of profit-dilution-motivated firms is less effective, their surplus quality can also be improved with better regulation. (3) It is further verified that this inter-firm variation in regulatory effects is not due to regulatory capture, but rather to insufficient regulatory resources. Good internal control quality and high market attention can significantly alleviate the siphoning effect caused by regulatory resource constraints. In the context of strengthening and improving modern financial supervision in China, it is important to study how regulatory resource constraints affect the surplus quality of listed companies in order to improve regulatory effectiveness.

Key words: Stock Exchange Regulation, Siphon Effect, Surplus Quality, Resource Constraints