证监会随机监管能抑制大股东“掏空”行为吗？

财经论丛 ›› 2025, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (3): 87-98.

证监会随机监管能抑制大股东“掏空”行为吗？

马惠娴¹, 刘文欣², 马静茹³, 耀友福⁴

1.南京农业大学金融学院,江苏南京 210095;
2.北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京 100875;
3.北京工商大学商学院,北京 100048;
4.贵州财经大学会计学院,贵州贵阳 550025

收稿日期:2024-03-18 出版日期:2025-03-10 发布日期:2025-03-10
作者简介:马惠娴(1994—),女,江苏盐城人,南京农业大学金融学院讲师;刘文欣(1997—),男,山东潍坊人,北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院博士生,通信作者;马静茹(1998—),女,山东济宁人,北京工商大学商学院博士生;耀友福(1988—),男,贵州清镇人,贵州财经大学会计学院副教授。
基金资助:
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2023SJYB0063);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(SKYC2023011)

Can CSRC's Random Inspection Curb the “Tunneling” Behavior of Major Shareholders?

MA Huixian¹, LIU Wenxin², MA Jingru³, YAO Youfu⁴

1. School of Finance, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China;
2. School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;
3. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China;
4. School of Accounting, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Received:2024-03-18 Online:2025-03-10 Published:2025-03-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2014—2020年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察了证监会随机抽查制度对大股东“掏空”行为的治理效果和作用机制。研究发现,证监会随机抽查监管能够显著抑制大股东“掏空”行为。机制检验发现,证监会随机抽查通过加强公司治理与改善信息披露抑制大股东“掏空”行为。异质性分析表明,证监会随机抽查能够有效弥补较弱的内外部监督机制,在机构持股比例较低、内部控制质量较差的企业中其对大股东“掏空”行为的抑制作用更为显著。同时,大股东“掏空”动机与能力越强,证监会随机抽查对大股东“掏空”行为的抑制作用越显著。此外,证监会随机抽查能够与问询函监管形成监管联动,增强对大股东“掏空”行为的治理效果。

关键词: 证监会随机抽查, 投资者保护, 大股东掏空, 公司治理, 信息披露

Abstract: Using A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2020 as a sample, this study examines the governance effect of the CSRC's Random Inspection on the “tunneling” behavior of major shareholders and the mechanism involved. The findings show that the CSRC's Random Inspection can significantly curb such behavior. Mechanism analysis reveals that the CSRC's Random Inspection curbs the “tunneling” behavior of major shareholders by strengthening corporate governance and improving information disclosure. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the CSRC's Random Inspection effectively compensates for weak internal and external supervision mechanisms and the governance effect on the “tunneling” behavior of major shareholders is particularly significant in companies with low institutional shareholding ratios and poor internal control quality. Further research indicates that the stronger the motivation and capability of major shareholders to engage in “tunneling” behavior is, the more significant the governance effect of the CSRC's Random Inspection on such behavior is. Finally, the CSRC's Random Inspection synergizes with inquiry letter supervision, enhancing the governance effect on the “tunneling” behavior of major shareholders.

Key words: CSRC' s Random Inspection, Investor Rights Protection, Tunneling of Major Shareholders, Corporate Governance, Information Disclosure

中图分类号:

F272.3

马惠娴, 刘文欣, 马静茹, 耀友福. 证监会随机监管能抑制大股东“掏空”行为吗？[J]. 财经论丛, 2025, 41(3): 87-98.

MA Huixian, LIU Wenxin, MA Jingru, YAO Youfu. Can CSRC's Random Inspection Curb the “Tunneling” Behavior of Major Shareholders?[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2025, 41(3): 87-98.

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