基于完全信息静态博弈的专车补贴策略研究

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 105-112.

• 政府管制 • 上一篇

基于完全信息静态博弈的专车补贴策略研究

陈明艺, 李娜

上海理工大学管理学院,上海 200093

收稿日期:2016-06-24 出版日期:2017-01-10 发布日期:2017-01-10
作者简介:陈明艺(1971-),女,陕西西安人,上海理工大学管理学院副教授;李娜(1992-),女,甘肃兰州人,上海理工大学管理学院硕士生。
基金资助:
国家社科基金资助项目(13BJY021)

Study on Tailored Taxi Subsidy Policy Based on Complete Information Static Game

CHEN Mingyi, LI Na

School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China

Received:2016-06-24 Online:2017-01-10 Published:2017-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 网络预约专车因其便捷性、补贴政策吸引了大量乘客,对传统出租车市场造成了极大冲击。专车的高额补贴政策是否会持续？抑或占领市场后提高价格,进而损害消费者利益？本文通过建立完全信息静态博弈模型,分析两种补贴策略对专车价格及乘客选择的影响。研究结果表明:目前的补贴政策难以长期维持,进一步地模型计算得出专车的合理价格区间,有利于网络预约专车市场的有序发展。

关键词: 专车, 补贴政策, 完全信息静态博弈, 纳什均衡

Abstract: The network booking tailored taxi has developed rapidly and had a severe impact on the traditional taxi market with its convenient service and its subsidy policy in our country. Will the higher subsidies be sustainable, or will the network booking taxi company increase its price, thus hurting its consumers? This paper establishes a complete information static game model to analyze the effect of two kinds of subsidy policy on taliored taxi's price and the choice of the passengers. It's found that the subsidy policy is difficult to maintain in the long run. The paper further figures out the range of reasonable price for tailored taxi, which will be of help for an orderly development of the talored taxi market.

Key words: tailored taxi, subsidy policy, complete information static game, Nash equilibrium

中图分类号:

F713

陈明艺, 李娜. 基于完全信息静态博弈的专车补贴策略研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(1): 105-112.

CHEN Mingyi, LI Na. Study on Tailored Taxi Subsidy Policy Based on Complete Information Static Game[J]. , 2017, 33(1): 105-112.

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基于完全信息静态博弈的专车补贴策略研究

Study on Tailored Taxi Subsidy Policy Based on Complete Information Static Game

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