财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 77-84.

• 财务与会计 • 上一篇    下一篇

债券融资、关系型承销与上市企业盈余质量

吕怀立   

  1. 上海大学管理学院,上海 200444
  • 收稿日期:2016-03-08 出版日期:2017-01-10 发布日期:2017-01-10
  • 作者简介:吕怀立(1983-),男,山东梁山人,上海大学管理学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202043);上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2016EGL003)

Bond Financing,Relationship Underwriting and Firm's Earnings Quality

LV Huaili   

  1. School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China
  • Received:2016-03-08 Online:2017-01-10 Published:2017-01-10

摘要: 盈余信息的决策有用性不仅受到盈余信息本身的影响,而且受到决策环境的制约。本文将盈余信息纳入到企业的融资环境,研究债券融资及其承销行为对企业信息披露政策的影响。采用我国沪深A股市场的债券融资数据,实证研究发现:一方面,上市企业在债券发行中存在着强烈的盈余操纵动机,表现为债券融资增量越高的企业,其盈余质量越差;另一方面,债券具有一定程度的监督作用,债券融资存量越高的企业,其盈余质量越好。进一步研究发现,发债企业与主承销商建立的关系型承销行为能够降低债券发行中的盈余操纵动机,并在一定程度上提升债券的监督作用。

关键词: 债券融资, 关系型承销, 盈余质量, 监督作用, 盈余操纵动机

Abstract: Decision usefulness of earnings is jointly determined by the decision context and the accounting information. This paper examines whether firm's disclosure policy is influenced by public debt financing. Based on the data of bond financing in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share capital market,the empirical research finds that public debt has active earnings management incentives and monitoring effects. The results also find relationship underwriting between firms with public debt offering and its underwriters can reduce the incentives of earnings management and improve the effects of monitoring.

Key words: bond financing, relationship underwriting, earnings quality, monitoring effects, earnings management incentives

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