社会资本、关联方交易与利益输送——基于区域社会规范和社会关系的考察

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 67-76.

社会资本、关联方交易与利益输送——基于区域社会规范和社会关系的考察

孟为, 郭雪萌

北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京 100044

收稿日期:2016-04-14 出版日期:2017-01-10 发布日期:2017-01-10
作者简介:孟为(1991-),女,山东聊城人,北京交通大学经济管理学院博士生;郭雪萌(1966-),女,北京市人,北京交通大学经济管理学院教授,博士。
基金资助:
中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2015YJS097)

Social Capital,Related Party Transactions and Tunneling & Propping——Evidence from the Exploration on Social Norm and Social Ties of the Provincial Level

MENG Wei, GUO Xuemeng

School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China

Received:2016-04-14 Online:2017-01-10 Published:2017-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于社会认同和信息理论,以2009年~2014年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究上市公司所在区域社会资本与大股东利益输送之间的关系。研究发现:社会资本可有效抑制大股东掏空,两者关系在较差的信息环境中表现更为明显。社会资本促进了处于财务困境的上市公司大股东向其提供关联抵押担保以度过难关。进一步的研究表明,关联方与上市公司处于同一地区加剧了“掏空”,高社会资本区域企业的滞后期应计项目盈余管理与“支持”显著正相关。社会资本作为一项重要的非正式制度可有效保护外部投资者利益,为上市公司改善内外部治理、建立外部中小股东的利益保障机制提供参考。

关键词: 社会资本, 利益输送, 关联方交易

Abstract: Based on the social identity theory and information theory and using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2014,the paper analyzes the relation between social capital and tunneling & propping by large shareholders. We find that firms with greater amount of social capital are associated with a lower degree of large shareholders' tunneling,especially in conditions of information asymmetry. In addition,the result shows that shareholders prefer to using unexpected loan guarantees to prop listed firms rather than related–party sales among firms which are in financial distress.Several additional tests show that if listed firms and their related parties are located in the same geographical province,the degree of tunneling would be intensified. The earnings management improves the degree of propping in high-social capital province. In conclusion,as an important aspect of informal institution,social capital can restrain the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders effectively,as well as protect the interests of the external investors. This paper provides a reference for the public firms to perfect their internal and external governance and build the mechanism to protect minor investors' interest.

Key words: social capital, tunneling and propping, related-party transactions

中图分类号:

F275.1

孟为, 郭雪萌. 社会资本、关联方交易与利益输送——基于区域社会规范和社会关系的考察[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(1): 67-76.

MENG Wei, GUO Xuemeng. Social Capital,Related Party Transactions and Tunneling & Propping——Evidence from the Exploration on Social Norm and Social Ties of the Provincial Level[J]. , 2017, 33(1): 67-76.

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