内部控制、学历水平与高管腐败:理论框架与实证

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (6): 69-78.

内部控制、学历水平与高管腐败:理论框架与实证

李连华

浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2017-01-09 出版日期:2017-06-10 发布日期:2017-06-10
作者简介:李连华(1961-),男,河南西华人,浙江财经大学会计学院教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家社科基金重点项目(15AJY002)

Internal Control, Educational Level and Executive Corruption: Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis

LI Lianhua

School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economic, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2017-01-09 Online:2017-06-10 Published:2017-06-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文将内部控制、学历水平与高管腐败纳入到一个统一的分析逻辑和理论框架之中。研究结论显示,企业内部控制和人口统计学意义上的高管学历特征,是影响高管腐败的两个显著因素。其中内部控制作为主变量在抑制高管腐败过程中具有显著效应;而高管学历水平作为调节变量在内部控制抑制企业腐败的过程中具有调节效应。进一步基于要素层次的研究结果表明,内部控制对于高管腐败的防控作用是介由内部环境、信息与沟通、内部监督三个要素的改善而实现的。以上结论形成对于现有文献的有益补充,实现了对反腐败理论的延伸拓展,而且对寻找有效的腐败治理政策也具有实践意义。

关键词: 内部控制, 学历水平, 高管腐败, 防控政策

Abstract: This paper puts the internal control, educational level and executive corruption into a unified theoretical framework and logical analysis. The results of this study indicate that the internal control in enterprises and executives' educational level are two significant factors in executive corruption. The internal control as the main variable in executive corruption has significant effect, and executives' educational level as a regulating variable has a regulating effect in the process of internal control preventing corruption in enterprises. This paper further reveals that on factor level, the internal control effect for the prevention and control of executive corruption is achieved through the improvement of the internal environment, information and communication, and internal supervision.

Key words: Internal Control, Educational Level, Executive Corruption, Prevention Policy

中图分类号:

F239

李连华. 内部控制、学历水平与高管腐败:理论框架与实证[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(6): 69-78.

LI Lianhua. Internal Control, Educational Level and Executive Corruption: Theoretical Framework and Empirical Analysis[J]. , 2017, 33(6): 69-78.

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