“宽放”“善管”与企业避税

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (11): 30-40.

“宽放”“善管”与企业避税

刘畅¹, 张景华²

1.天津财经大学财税与公共管理学院,天津 300222;
2.中共国家税务总局党校科研所,江苏扬州 225007

收稿日期:2018-12-05 出版日期:2019-11-10 发布日期:2019-12-16
作者简介:刘畅(1992-),女,天津市人,天津财经大学财税与公共管理学院讲师,博士;张景华(1982-),男,福建三明人,中共国家税务总局党校科研所副研究员,博士后。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目(16CJL003);江苏省第五期“333工程”培养资金资助项目(BRA2018199)

Speeding up Streamlining Administration,Strengthening Government Management and Tax Avoidance

LIU Chang¹, ZHANG Jinghua²

1.School of Public Finance ＆ Administration, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222,China;
2.SAT Party School Research Institute of CPC, Yangzhou 225007,China

Received:2018-12-05 Online:2019-11-10 Published:2019-12-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： “放”与“管”作为两种不同类型的制度要素,是否会激发纳税人形成迥异的心理机制？能否矫正企业因税负痛感而形成的避税倾向？实证研究表明:政府“宽放”与“善管”对于企业税收规避均具有矫正效应;在政府权力下放程度越高的地区,“善管”与“宽放”的叠加效应愈加明显;较之于“善管”,随企业税负水平的提高,适度“宽放”更有利于矫正企业避税。立足放管结合,研究为进一步厘清深化行政体制改革的施力点提供了微观领域的经验证据,并为更具针对性地以“善管”促“宽放”,以此提升税收遵从度提供了有益的“出口”。

关键词: “宽放”, “善管”, 企业避税

Abstract: As “speeding up streamlining administration” and “strengthening government management” are two different types of institutional elements, would they lead taxpayers to form different psychological mechanism? Would they correct the tax avoidance tendency caused by the sense of tax pain? The findings of this study are as follows: (1)Both “speeding up streamlining administration” and “strengthening government management” have corrective effect on enterprises' tax avoidance. (2)The more decentralized the government is, the more obvious superposition effect will be produced between “streamlining administration” and “government management”. (3)With the increase of the enterprise tax burden, speeding up streamlining administration will bring about a more significant correction effect on tax avoidance. From the perspective of brief administration, tax and burden reduction, this paper further combines the role of delegation and management, provides empirical evidence from the micro-perspective for further clarifying the direction and focus of deepening the reform of the administrative system, more targeted “strengthening management” to promote “wide release”, and seeks beneficial ways to improve tax compliance.

Key words: Speeding Up Streamlining Administration, Strengthening Government Management, Tax Avoidance

中图分类号:

F812.42

刘畅, 张景华. “宽放”“善管”与企业避税[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(11): 30-40.

LIU Chang, ZHANG Jinghua. Speeding up Streamlining Administration,Strengthening Government Management and Tax Avoidance[J]. , 2019, 35(11): 30-40.

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