市场深化弱化了民营企业政治关系的作用吗？——来自民营上市公司政治关系贷款效应的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (11): 41-50.

市场深化弱化了民营企业政治关系的作用吗？——来自民营上市公司政治关系贷款效应的经验证据

胡旭阳, 孟顺杰

浙江财经大学金融学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2019-03-25 出版日期:2019-11-10 发布日期:2019-12-16
作者简介:胡旭阳(1969-),男,安徽休宁人,浙江财经大学金融学院教授;孟顺杰(1994-),男,浙江诸暨人,浙江财经大学金融学院硕士生。
基金资助:
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题(19NDJC159YB);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71572172;71773105);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY17G030024)

Does Market Deepening Weaken the Value of Political Connection of Chinese Private Firms ——Evidence from the Loan Effect of Political Connection of Publicly Listed Private Firms

HU Xuyang, MENG Shunjie

School of Finance,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018,China

Received:2019-03-25 Online:2019-11-10 Published:2019-12-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文从政治关系经济效应形成的市场替代机制与政府偏袒机制视角揭示市场深化影响民营企业政治关系贷款效应动态变化的理论机理,并以2003~2017年上市民营企业为研究样本,采用公司固定效应模型对相关理论假设进行实证检验。本文的理论和实证研究结果显示:第一,样本期内,民营企业政治关系的贷款效应呈现动态弱化趋势;第二,民营企业政治关系贷款效应的动态弱化与中国转轨过程中市场化总体水平的上升密切相关。本文的研究理论意义在于为体制转轨与企业政治关系经济影响动态变化关系的理论争议提供了来自世界最大转轨经济体的经验证据;从现实意义看,可为“亲清”新型政商关系建设提供启示。

关键词: 民营企业, 政治关系, 市场深化, 市场替代机制, 政府偏袒机制

Abstract: This article aims to investigate theoretically and empirically whether the loan effect of political connection weakens during the process of Chinese institutional transition. Theoretically, the article explains the mechanism by which market deepening affects the dynamic change of the loan effect of political connection from the viewpoint of the two formation mechanism of political connection's economic effect: the market substitution mechanism and the government favoritism mechanism. The empirical research based on a sample of publicly listed firms from 2003 to 2017 with firm-fixed effect model produces the following findings: firstly, the loan effect of political connection of private firms does weaken during the sample period; secondly, the weakening trend of the loan effect of political connection is highly correlated with the trend of market deepening. Our research not only enriches the literature on the dispute as to whether the market-oriented reform reduces the value of political connection, but also gives an insight into the construction of a Close-Clear government-business relationship in China.

Key words: Private Firm, Political Connection, Market Deepening, Market Substitution Mechanism, Government Favoritism, Mechanism

中图分类号:

F272

胡旭阳, 孟顺杰. 市场深化弱化了民营企业政治关系的作用吗？——来自民营上市公司政治关系贷款效应的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(11): 41-50.

HU Xuyang, MENG Shunjie. Does Market Deepening Weaken the Value of Political Connection of Chinese Private Firms ——Evidence from the Loan Effect of Political Connection of Publicly Listed Private Firms[J]. , 2019, 35(11): 41-50.

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