控股股东股权质押与公司业绩预告行为

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以2007~2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了控股股东股权质押对公司业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押降低了公司业绩预告的自愿性和精确度,增加了业绩预告偏差;降低业绩预告精确度,增加业绩预告偏差的作用在强制披露业绩预告情形下更显著;降低业绩预告自愿性和精确度,增加业绩预告偏差的作用在审计质量较低企业中更显著。作用机制分析发现,控股股东股权质押降低业绩预告自愿性和精确度,增加业绩预告偏差的作用仅体现在卖空限制的公司;控股股东股权质押解除后,该作用不再显著。本文研究对于完善业绩预告制度和股权质押制度,维护资本市场稳定具有借鉴意义。

关键词: 股权质押, 业绩预告, 信息披露

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between the controlling shareholder equity pledge and corporate earnings forecasts behavior based on the sample of China A-share listed firms during 2007~2017. This study finds that firms with controlling shareholders pledging their shares are less likely to issue earnings forecasts voluntarily and precisely, and are more likely to disclose with bias. This relation is more significant with the subsample of mandatory earning forecasts and companies with low audit quality. In addition, this relation only exists in companies with short selling restriction; After the release of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge, this relation is not significant. This study has policy implication for improving the earnings forecasts system, the equity pledge, and the maintenance of the capital market stability.

Key words: Equity Pledge, Earnings Forecasts, Information Disclosure

中图分类号:

F275.5

常利民. 控股股东股权质押与公司业绩预告行为[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(9): 74-83.

CHANG Limin. Controlling Shareholder's Equity Pledge and Corporate Earnings Forecast[J]. , 2020, 36(9): 74-83.

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