控股股东董事会改革与国有企业过度负债——央企集团建设规范董事会的证据

财经论丛 ›› 2024, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (1): 59-67.

控股股东董事会改革与国有企业过度负债——央企集团建设规范董事会的证据

秦帅¹, 王晨曦², 谭劲松²

1.广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州 510520;
2.中山大学管理学院/现代会计与财务研究中心,广东广州 510275

出版日期:2024-01-10 发布日期:2024-01-10
通讯作者: 谭劲松(1965—),男,湖南邵阳人,中山大学管理学院/现代会计与财务研究中心教授,博士。
作者简介:秦帅(1992—),男,河南驻马店人,广东工业大学管理学院讲师,博士; 王晨曦(1997—),男,江苏淮安人,中山大学管理学院/现代会计与财务研究中心博士生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71972189);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD23XGL027;GD23XGL028)

Controlling Shareholders' Board Reform and Excessive Indebtedness of State-owned Enterprises: Evidence from Board Reform of Central State-owned Enterprise Groups

QIN Shuai¹, WANG Chenxi², TAN Jinsong²

1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China;
2. School of Business/Center for Accounting, Finance and Institutions, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Online:2024-01-10 Published:2024-01-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中国国有企业的负债率长期高于其他所有制形式企业,降低国有企业过度负债水平是防范化解重大风险的重要内容,需要强化控股股东这一关键少数的治理。本文以央企集团建设规范董事会为准自然实验,尝试打开控股股东治理结构的黑箱,通过构建多时点DID模型研究发现,央企集团建设规范董事会能够显著抑制控股上市公司的过度负债水平。机制检验发现,央企集团建设规范董事会降低了控股上市公司的代理问题、硬化了预算约束、提升了内部控制水平和内源融资能力,进而降低了上市公司过度负债水平。异质性检验发现,央企集团建设规范董事会对上市公司过度负债的抑制作用会受到规范董事会外部董事比重、央企集团所有者缺位程度以及央企集团对上市公司管控力度的影响。本文基于控股股东董事会的视角回答了控股股东治理结构变化如何影响上市公司治理效果的问题,对国有企业改革、董事会建设等方面的研究亦有所贡献。

关键词: 控股股东, 过度负债, 央企集团, 规范董事会

Abstract: The debt ratio of China's state-owned enterprises has long been higher than that of other forms of ownership for a long time. Reducing the excessive debt level of state-owned enterprises is an important content of preventing and resolving major risks, which requires strengthening the governance of controlling shareholders, a key minority. This paper takes the establishment of a standardized board by a central state-owned enterprise group as a quasi-natural experiment, and tries to open the black box of the governance structure of the controlling shareholders.
By constructing a staggered DID model, this paper makes the following observations: (1) The construction of a standardized board of directors by a central state-owned enterprise group can significantly restrain the excessive debt level of the controlling listed company. (2) Mechanism testing finds that the construction of a standardized board by state-owned enterprise groups reduces the agency problem of controlling listed companies, hardens budget constraints, improves internal control levels and internal financing capabilities, thus reducing the excessive debt level of listed companies. (3) The heterogeneity test shows that the inhibitory effect of the standardized board of the central state-owned enterprise group on the excessive debt of listed companies is affected by the proportion of outside directors of the standardized board, the absence degree of the owners of the central state-owned enterprise group and the control strength of the central state-owned enterprise group on listed companies. Based on the perspective of controlling shareholders' board, this paper answers the question of how the change of the controlling shareholders' governance structure affects the governance effect of listed companies, and also contributes to the research on the reform of state-owned enterprises and the construction of the board of directors.

Key words: Controlling Shareholders, Excessive Debt, Central Enterprise Group, Board Reform of Central State-owned Enterprises

中图分类号:

F230

秦帅, 王晨曦, 谭劲松. 控股股东董事会改革与国有企业过度负债——央企集团建设规范董事会的证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2024, 40(1): 59-67.

QIN Shuai, WANG Chenxi, TAN Jinsong. Controlling Shareholders' Board Reform and Excessive Indebtedness of State-owned Enterprises: Evidence from Board Reform of Central State-owned Enterprise Groups[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2024, 40(1): 59-67.

参考文献

[1]钟宁桦, 刘志阔, 何嘉鑫, 等. 我国企业债务的结构性问题[J]. 经济研究, 2016, (7): 102-117.
[2]张晓晶, 刘磊. 新冠肺炎疫情冲击下稳增长与稳杠杆的艰难平衡[J]. 国际经济评论, 2020, (2): 81-100.
[3]纪洋, 王旭, 谭语嫣, 等. 经济政策不确定性、政府隐性担保与企业杠杆率分化[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2018, (2): 449-470.
[4]许晓芳, 汤泰劼, 陆正飞. 控股股东股权质押与高杠杆公司杠杆操纵——基于我国A股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2021, (10): 153-170.
[5]Liu Q., Tian G. Controlling Shareholder, Expropriations and Firm's Leverage Decision: Evidence from Chinese Non-tradable Share Reform[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2012, 18(4): 782-803.
[6]张淼, 孙光国. 多个大股东能驱动企业降低过度负债水平吗[J]. 财经科学, 2022, (3): 29-43.
[7]秦永法. 央企董事会试点的进展和需解决的问题[J]. 董事会, 2012, (10): 49-55.
[8]李文贵, 余明桂, 钟慧洁. 央企董事会试点、国有上市公司代理成本与企业绩效[J]. 管理世界, 2017, (8): 123-135.
[9]Cai G., Xu Y., Yu D., et al. Strengthened Board Monitoring from Parent Company and Stock Price Crash Risk of Subsidiary Firms[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2019, 56: 352-368.
[10]Xie S., Xu Y., Zeng Y., et al. Ultimate Parent Board Reform and Corporate Over-investment: A Quasi-natural Experiment Study[J]. Accounting and Finance, 2019, 58(5): 1469-1501.
[11]白俊, 邱善运, 刘园园. 央企董事会试点: 治理规范影响国企创新吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J]. 现代财经(天津财经大学学报), 2019, (7): 35-51.
[12]黄华, 何威风, 吴玉宇. 央企董事会试点与上市公司盈余管理行为[J]. 会计研究, 2020, (7): 90-103.
[13]高瑜彬, 毛聚, 毛新述. 中央企业董事会试点与上市公司审计质量[J]. 审计研究, 2021, (4): 88-97.
[14]于瑶, 祁怀锦. 集团公司董事会建设与央企全要素生产率——一项准自然实验[J]. 经济管理, 2021, (10): 24-41.
[15]王红建, 杨筝, 阮刚铭, 等. 放松利率管制、过度负债与债务期限结构[J]. 金融研究, 2018, (2): 100-117.
[16]申广军, 张延, 王荣. 结构性减税与企业去杠杆[J]. 金融研究, 2018, (12): 105-122.
[17]周菲, 赵亮, 尹雷. 去杠杆的路径选择: 财政去杠杆还是金融去杠杆?——基于企业部门的分析[J]. 财政研究, 2019, (2): 75-90.
[18]张一林, 蒲明. 债务展期与结构性去杠杆[J]. 经济研究, 2018, (7): 32-46.
[19]蒋灵多, 陆毅. 市场竞争加剧是否助推国有企业加杠杆[J]. 中国工业经济, 2018, (11): 155-173.
[20]蒋灵多, 陆毅, 纪珽. 贸易自由化是否助力国有企业去杠杆[J]. 世界经济, 2019, (9): 101-125.
[21]吴秋生, 独正元. 混合所有制改革程度、政府隐性担保与国企过度负债[J]. 经济管理, 2019, (8): 162-177.
[22]陈艳利, 钱怀安. 非国有股东治理与国有企业去杠杆[J]. 财经问题研究, 2021, (6): 118-126.
[23]翟淑萍, 毛文霞, 白梦诗. 国有上市公司杠杆操纵治理研究——基于党组织治理视角[J]. 证券市场导报, 2021, (11): 12-23.
[24]Cai G., Xie S., Xu Y., et al. Ultimate Parent's Board Reform and Controlling Shareholder Entrenchment: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment in China[J]. Emerging Markets Review, 2019, 38(3): 389-403.
[25]谭劲松, 简宇寅, 陈颖. 政府干预与不良贷款——以某国有商业银行1988~2005年的数据为例[J]. 管理世界, 2012, (7): 29-43.
[26]纳鹏杰, 雨田木子, 纳超洪. 企业集团风险传染效应研究——来自集团控股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2017, (3): 53-60.
[27]陆正飞, 何捷, 窦欢. 谁更过度负债: 国有还是非国有企业?[J]. 经济研究, 2015, (12): 54-67.
[28]汪玉兰, 窦笑晨, 李井林. 集团控制会导致企业过度负债吗[J]. 会计研究, 2020, (4): 76-87.
[29]江艇. 因果推断经验研究中的中介效应与调节效应[J]. 中国工业经济, 2022, (5): 100-120.