关键词: 跨境并购, 高管薪酬, 海外经历, 高管权力, 超额薪酬

Abstract: Based on the data of listed companies that implemented cross-border M&As from 2012 to 2019, the paper uses the propensity-score matching approach and the difference-in-differences estimation method to study the impact of cross-border M&As on executive compensation, its influenc emechanism and heterogeneities. The results show that cross-border M&As have significantly increased the executive compensation of Chinese listed companies, and they still play a role in the third year after M&As. Further analysis finds that cross-border M&As can increase executive compensation through both market channels and non-market channels. In terms of market channels, cross-border M&As allow executives with overseas experience to receive higher salaries. In terms of non-market channels, cross-border M&As enable executives with more power to earn more and increase the excessive compensation of executives. This paper clarifies the mechanism of cross-border M&As affecting executive compensation, which not only has a certain reference significance for the management of corporate executive compensation under the background of the “One Belt and One Road”, but also provides useful enlightenment for the further practice of Chinese companies “going global”.

Key words: Cross-border M&As, Executive Compensation, Overseas Experience, Managerial Power, Excessive Compensation