Abstract: In view of monopoly nature and residents’ transportation rights after privatization, the Japanese government introduced the price-cap regulation along with yardstick competition between regions and maintained the integrity of the local railway network through the various institutional designs. China railway reform in 2013 is essentially separating government administration from company management, the reform itself does not change the nature of monopoly and non-profit. Consequently, using the reform as an excuse, implementing the market mechanism in pricing is lack of theoretical basis.longitudinal comparison. Similarly, in order to ensure the residents’ transportation rights, the Japanese government basically maintain the integrity of the local railway network through the system design of financial subsidies and separation of infrastructure from operation. China railway reform in 2013 is essentially separating government administration from company management, the reform itself does not change the railway transport’s nature of monopoly and non-profit. Consequently, using the reform as an excuse, implementing the market mechanism in pricing is lack of theoretical basis.

摘要： 鉴于民营化改革后的铁路运输公司仍具有区域垄断的性质，日本政府导入了区域间标尺竞争下的价格上限规制，该机制保留了收益率规制的某些特点，但是通过横向比较和纵向比较引入了竞争机制。同样，为了保证居民的交通权，日本政府通过财政补贴和网运分离等制度设计，基本上维护了地方铁路网络的完整性。我国2013年铁路体制改革的实质是政企分开，改革本身并没有改变网运一体化下铁路运输的自然垄断性及其公益性，因此以政企分开为借口，完全实施市场机制是缺乏理论依据的。