Abstract: Using data of listed company in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with non-current asset disposal gains and losses in the period 2007-2014， the paper means to analyze the earnings management motivation of non-current assets disposal and the control effect of board of directors on earnings management. The results of the study show :(1) the listed companies will make use of the disposal of non-current assets to turn loss into profit in current profit-loss year, and if they cannot turn loss into profit in current profit-loss year, the listed companies will delay the disposal until the future year when required, then they will be engaged in the great purge of earning management behavior of non-current assets. (2) in board of directors mechanism, earning management is indistinctively negatively associated with the board size，there are significant negative relationship between the general manager duality, the proportion of independent directors and earnings management. (3) compared with the private listed company, state-owned enterprises are more inclined to choose real earnings management for earnings manipulation．the general manager duality and the proportion of independent directors of the state-owned listed corporation is more perfect, and board meeting of private listed company is more perfect..

摘要： 以沪深两市2007-2014年发生非流动资产处置损益的A股上市公司为研究样本，分析非流动资产处置的盈余管理动机以及公司董事会特征对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司为了实现扭亏和大洗清的目标，存在利用非流动资产处置收益实施盈余管理的行为；（2）董事会治理机制中，董事长与总经理两职合一、独立董事比例和董事会开会次数与真实盈余管理水平显著负相关，董事会规模与真实盈余管理水平没有相关关系；（3）相对于民营上市公司，国有上市公司真实盈余管理动机更强，其董事长与总经理两职合一和独立董事比例抑制盈余管理的功能优于民营上市公司；而民营上市公司的董事会开会次数的监督功能更为有效。