Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the director network and tunneling from the perspective of social network and in light of the moderating effect of property rights. The results of the research indicate that the director network centrality is significantly U-type related to the tunneling level, which reveals the “double-edged sword” function of the director network in the governance of tunneling of major shareholders. When the samples are further divided into state-owned and private-owned enterprises for grouping regression, it is found that the U-type relationship is more significant in private-owned enterprises. In addition, the study also finds that the director network centrality of listed companies is generally of a high level and there exists the phenomenon of “excessive chain” . The study provides new empirical evidence and practical reference for enterprises and regulatory authorities to regulate the behavior of director interlocking, restrain the tunneling of large shareholders and enhance investors protection.

Key words: Director Network, Network Centrality, Tunneling, Social Capital, Property Right

摘要： 从社会网络视角实证分析董事网络对大股东掏空行为的影响机制,并考虑产权性质的权变因素。研究结果表明:董事网络中心度与大股东掏空程度呈显著的U型关系,揭示了董事网络在大股东掏空治理中的“双刃剑”作用,进一步地,把样本分为国有企业和民营企业进行分组回归,发现这种U型关系在民营企业中表现得更为显著。另外,研究还发现,我国上市公司董事网络中心度普遍偏高,存在“过度连锁”的现象。研究为企业及监管部门规范董事兼任行为、抑制大股东掏空、增强投资者保护提供了新的经验证据和实践参考。

关键词: 董事网络, 网络中心度, 掏空, 社会资本, 产权性质