Monitoring and Anti-monitoring: CEO Narcissism and Corporate Venture Capital

Abstract

Abstract: In view of the importance of narcissism in CEO's psychological traits, this study posits that CEO narcissism has a positive impact on corporate venture capital from the cognition and motivation perspectives. Furthermore, based on the concept of managerial discretion, this paper argues that internal monitoring (block ownership, independent directors) and external monitoring (government regulation) will negatively moderate the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate venture capital by reducing the CEO's managerial discretion. In addition, CEO's managerial discretion will expand when the CEO serves as the chairman of the board or has political ties, thereby weakening the constraints of internal and external monitoring. Findings based on the panel data of 206 Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies (2011-2016) from the pharmaceutical, electronic equipment and automotive industries support our theoretical predictions. The study not only has important theoretical implications for corporate entrepreneurship research, upper echelons theory and CEO narcissism research, but also has implications for corporate CEO appointment and corporate governance design and government policy formulation.

Key words: CEO Narcissism, Corporate Venture Capital(CVC), Monitoring, Managerial Discretion, Upper Echelons Theory

摘要： 基于高阶梯队理论,探究CEO自恋对公司创业投资的正向影响。进一步地,基于高阶梯队理论中管理自主权概念,提出企业内部监管(制衡股东持股比例、独立董事)和外部监管(政府监管)通过降低CEO的管理自主权弱化CEO自恋与公司创业投资之间的正向关系。而CEO兼任董事长(两职合一)和政治联系分别减弱企业内部监管和外部监管的负向调节作用,最终增强CEO自恋与公司创业投资之间的正向关系。基于来自医药、电子设备和汽车制造业206家沪深上市公司(2011~2016年)的数据,统计结果总体上支持了上述假设。文章不仅对公司创业研究、CEO自恋研究以及高阶梯队理论具有重要的理论启示,还为CEO任命、公司治理设计以及政府政策制定提供了思路。

关键词: CEO自恋, 公司创业投资, 监管, 管理自主权, 高阶梯队理论

CLC Number:

F275.1

DAI Weiqi, JIANG Haoran. Monitoring and Anti-monitoring: CEO Narcissism and Corporate Venture Capital[J]. , 2020, 36(12): 78-87.

戴维奇, 姜浩然. 监管与反监管:CEO自恋与公司创业投资[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(12): 78-87.

References

[1] Dushnitsky. Corporate Venture Capital: Past Evidence and Future Directions [M]. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
[2] Patrick, R. Exploring The Landscape Of Corporate Venture Capital: A Systematic Review of the Entrepreneurial and Finance Literature [J]. Management Review Quarterly, 2018, 68(3): 279-319.
[3] Hambrick, Finkelstein. Managerial Discretion: A Bridge Between Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes [J]. Research In Organizational Behavior, 1987, 9(4): 369-406.
[4] Chen, Liu, Ni, Wu. A Rational Normative Model of International Expansion: Strategic Intent Perspective, Market Positions, and Founder CEOs/Family-Successor CEOs [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2015, 68(7): 1539-1543.
[5] Engelen, Neumann, Schmidt. Should Entrepreneurially Oriented Firms Have Narcissistic CEOs? [J]. Journal of Management, 2016, 42(3): 698-721.
[6] Zhu, D. H. Chen, G. Narcissism, Director Selection, and Risk-Taking Spending [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2015, 36(13): 2075-2098.
[7] Buyl, T., Boone, C., Wade, J. B. CEO Narcissism, Risk-Taking, and Resilience: An Empirical Analysis in U.S. Commercial Banks. [J]. Journal of Management, 2019, 45(4): 1372-1400.
[8] Wangrow, D. B., Schepker, D. J., Barker, V. L., III. Managerial Discretion: An Empirical Review and Focus on Future Research Directions [J]. Journal of Management, 2015, 41(1): 99-135.
[9] Wales, W. J., Patel, P. C., Lumpkin, G. T. In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism, Entrepreneurial Orientation, and Firm Performance Variance [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2013, 50(6): 1041-1069.
[10] Antoinette, R., Harry, C. Narcissus Enters the Courtroom: CEO Narcissism and Fraud [J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2013, 117(2): 413-429.
[11] Gerstner, W. C., König, A., Enders, A., Hambrick, D. C. CEO Narcissism, Audience Engagement, and Organizational Adoption of Technological Discontinuities. [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2013, 58(2): 257-291.
[12] Finkelstein, Hambrick. Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1990, 35(3): 484-503.
[13] White, Jean, Roberto. Legal System Contingencies as Determinants of Political Tie Intensity by Wholly Owned Foreign Subsidiaries: Insights from the Philippines [J]. Journal of World Business, 2015, 50(2): 342-356.
[14] 朱冰, 张晓亮, 郑晓佳. 多个大股东与企业创新 [J]. 管理世界, 2018, 34(7): 151-165.
[15] Crossland, Hambrick. Differences in Managerial Discretion across Countries: How Nation-Level Institutions Affect the Degree to Which CEOs Matter [J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2011, 32(8): 797-819.
[16] Campbell. Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility [J]. Academy of Management Review, 2007, 32(3): 946-967.
[17] Kato, T., Long, C. CEO Turnover, Firm Performance,and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from Micro Data [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2006, 34(4): 796-817.
[18] 张建君, 张闫龙. 董事长—总经理的异质性、权力差距和融洽关系与组织绩效——来自上市公司的证据 [J]. 管理世界, 2016(1): 110-120.
[19] Haleblian, J., Finkelstein, S. Top Management Team Size, CEO Dominance, and Firm Performance: The Moderating Roles of Environmental Turbulence and Discretion [J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1993, 36(4): 844-863.
[20] Kingsley, Bergh, Bonardi. Political Markets and Regulatory Uncertainty: Insights and Implications for Integrated Strategy [J]. Academy of Management Perspectives, 2012, 26(3): 52-67.
[21] Liedong, T., Rajwani, T., Mellahi, K. Reality or Illusion? The Efficacy of Nonmarket Strategy in Institutional Risk Reduction [J]. British Journal of Management, 2017, 28(4): 609-628.
[22] Denise, D.H., Masaaki, K., Ram, M. A Story of Breakthrough vs. Incremental Innovation: Corporate Entrepreneurship in the Global Pharmaceutical Industry [J]. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2010, 4(2): 106–127.
[23] 吴建祖, 龚敏. 基于注意力基础观的CEO自恋对企业战略变革影响机制研究 [J]. 管理学报, 2018,(11): 1638-1646.
[24] Sahaym, Cho, Sang, Mousa. Mixed Blessings: How Top Management Team Heterogeneity and Governance Structure Influence the Use Of Corporate Venture Capital By Post-IPO Firms [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2016, 69(3): 1208-1218.
[25] Chatterjee, Hambrick. It's All about Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy and Performance [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007, 52(3): 351-386.
[26] Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., Xu, P. Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks. [J]. Corporate Governance, 2011, 19(5): 418-436.
[27] 郑国坚, 林东杰, 张飞达. 大股东财务困境、掏空与公司治理的有效性——来自大股东财务数据的证据 [J]. 管理世界, 2013(5): 157-168
[28] Wang, G., DeGhetto, K., Ellen, B. P., Lamont, B. T. Board Antecedents of CEO Duality and the Moderating Role of Country-level Managerial Discretion: A Meta-analytic Investigation [J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2019, 56(1): 172-202.
[29] Ge, J., Stanley, L. J., Eddleston, K., Kellermanns, F. W. Institutional Deterioration and Entrepreneurial Investment: The Role of Political Connections [J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2017, 32(4): 405-419.
[30] Xie, Q. CEO Tenure and Ownership Mode Choice of Chinese Firms: The Moderating Roles of Managerial Discretion [J]. International Business Review, 2014, 23(5): 910-919
[31] 郑珊珊.管理层权力强度、内外部监督与股价崩盘风险 [J]. 广东财经大学学报, 2019,(4): 72-86.