PPP Mode and Implicit Debt: Increase or Reduce the Burden?

Abstract

Abstract: The introduction of the PPP mode can shrink the government's book balance sheet, but the government's implicit debt problems are ignored. This paper analyzes the formation mechanism of the PPP implicit debt, and uses the quarterly panel data of 26 provinces and municipalities in China from 2016 to 2018 to construct a multiple endogenous threshold fixed effect model of the PPP mode and the government implicit debt, and verify the relationship between the PPP model and the government implicit debt. The study finds that the implementation of the PPP mode has a significant positive impact on the government's implicit debt, which has a certain sustainability; at the same time, as the proportion of the implicit debt increases, the positive impact increases, too. The impact direction is the same in different regions, but there are significant differences in strength. The conclusion is that the government should follow the principle of prudence, standardize procedures, and implement policies to control the size of the government implicit debts when implementing PPP projects.

Key words: PPP, Implicit Debt, City Investment Bond

摘要： 引入PPP模式能够收缩政府账面资产负债表,但其产生的政府隐性债务问题却被忽略。本文分析PPP隐性债务的形成机理,运用2016~2018年我国26个省及直辖市季度面板数据,构建PPP模式与政府隐性债务的多重内生门限固定效应模型,验证PPP模式与政府隐性债务的关系。研究发现:推行PPP模式对政府隐性债务有显著正向影响,具有一定的持续性;同时,随着隐性债务占比的增加,该正向影响力度加大;各个地区间影响方向相同,但力度存在显著差异。结论认为政府在推行PPP项目时应当遵循审慎原则,规范程序,因地施策,合理管控政府隐性债务规模。

关键词: PPP, 隐性债务, 城投债

CLC Number:

F812.7

XIE Jincheng, ZHANG Zongze, LIANG Hongzhi. PPP Mode and Implicit Debt: Increase or Reduce the Burden?[J]. , 2020, 36(4): 22-32.

谢进城, 张宗泽, 梁宏志. PPP模式与隐性债务:增加负担还是减轻负担？[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(4): 22-32.

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