Research on Officials' Tax Strategies at the Beginning of Their Tenure: New Evidence Based on DID

Collected Essays on Finance and Economics ›› 2022, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (4): 25-35.

Previous Articles Next Articles

Research on Officials' Tax Strategies at the Beginning of Their Tenure: New Evidence Based on DID

ZHAO Chunxiang¹, YE Huifen², YANG Yang¹

1. School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China;
2. School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2020-12-30 Online:2022-04-10 Published:2022-04-02

官员上任初期的税收策略研究——基于DID的新证据

赵纯祥¹, 叶慧芬², 杨怏¹

1.中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉 430073;
2.浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州 310018

作者简介:赵纯祥(1978—),男,湖南邵阳人,中南财经政法大学会计学院副教授;叶慧芬(1979—),女,安徽舒城人,浙江财经大学会计学院讲师;杨怏(1980—),女,湖南邵阳人,中南财经政法大学会计学院博士生。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目(20BGL084);湖北省技术创新专项软科学研究项目(2018ADC 027);中南财经政法大学基本科研业务费项目(2722020PY021)

Abstract

Abstract: There exist two opposite viewpoints about local governments' tax competition in prior research. Based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018, this paper conducts a DID test to examine the corporate tax burden changes between different periods and analyze officials' tax strategies at the beginning of their tenure. A significant decrease has been found in the effective tax rate of the enterprises located in the successive officials' jurisdictions. It indicates that they initiate the tax race to bottom. This conclusion remains valid after excluding the competing hypothesis that excessive tax is collected by former officials. Further analysis finds that local officials fall back on the relaxation of tax enforcement to win the tax race against officials in other regions because the power to set taxes and their rates is held by the central government. The main goal of the tax race to bottom is to compete for the capital of the industries with high liquidity. In the provinces with intensified promotion competition, local officials show more enthusiasm for the tax race to the bottom.

Key words: Successive Officials, Tax Strategies, New Economic Geography, Difference in Difference

摘要： 主流文献中关于地方政府税收竞争类型的观点存在分歧。本文基于我国A股上市公司2009—2018年数据,运用双重差分模型考察企业税负跨期纵向变化,对官员上任初期税收策略类型进行检验,发现官员上任后展开了税收逐底竞争。在排除前任官员收取过头税的竞争性假设和控制内生性问题后,本文的结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,我国设立税种和制定税率的权力集中在中央政府,地方官员难以降低法定税率,只能通过降低税收征管力度来实施税收逐底竞争。此外,地方官员税收竞争的主要对象是高流动性行业的资本,晋升竞争越激烈的省份,官员实施税收逐底竞争的积极性越高。

关键词: 继任官员, 税收策略, 新经济地理学, 双重差分

CLC Number:

F832

ZHAO Chunxiang¹, YE Huifen², YANG Yang¹. Research on Officials' Tax Strategies at the Beginning of Their Tenure: New Evidence Based on DID[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(4): 25-35.

赵纯祥, 叶慧芬, 杨怏. 官员上任初期的税收策略研究——基于DID的新证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(4): 25-35.

References

[1]周黎安. 中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J]. 经济研究, 2007, (7): 36-50.
[2]郭杰, 李涛. 中国地方政府间税收竞争研究——基于中国省级面板数据的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2009, (11): 54-64, 73.
[3]龙小宁, 朱艳丽, 蔡伟贤, 李少民. 基于空间计量模型的中国县级政府间税收竞争的实证分析[J]. 经济研究, 2014, (8): 41-53.
[4]许敬轩, 王小龙, 何振. 多维绩效考核、中国式政府竞争与地方税收征管[J]. 经济研究, 2019, (4): 33-48.
[5]沈坤荣, 付文林. 税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效[J]. 经济研究, 2006, (6): 16-26.
[6]雷根强, 何惠敏. 产业集聚对我国区域税收竞争的影响——对我国省际面板数据的检验[J]. 税务研究, 2009, (9): 26-30.
[7]付文林, 耿强. 税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2011, (4): 1329-1348.
[8]Chen Y., Li Z., Liu Z. Agglomeration and Actual Tax Rates: Firm-level Evidence from China[J]. Regional Studies, 2017, 2(1):1-12.
[9]钱金保, 才国伟. 地方政府的税收竞争和标杆竞争——基于地市级数据的实证研究[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2017, (3): 1097-1118.
[10]Solé-Ollé A. Electoral Accountability and Tax Mimicking: The Effects of Electoral Margins, Coalition Government and Ideology[J]. European Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 19(4):685-713.
[11]Pierson P. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis[M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
[12]陈德球, 陈运森, 董志勇. 政策不确定性、税收征管强度与企业税收规避[J]. 管理世界, 2016, (5): 151-163.
[13]卢洪友, 张楠. 地方政府换届、税收征管与税收激进[J]. 经济管理, 2016, (2): 160-168.
[14]Fischel W.A. Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities: A Non-technical Digest[A]. Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Taxation Held under the Auspices of the National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, [C]. 1974, 67: 632-656.
[15]Zodrow G.R., Mieszkowski P. Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 1986, 19(3):356-370.
[16]Wildasin D.E. Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective Subsidy[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 1989, 25(2): 193-212.
[17]Hoyt W.H. Property Taxation, Nash Equilibrium, and Market Power[J]. Journal of Urban Economics, 1991, 34(1):123-131.
[18]Allers M.A., Elhorst J.P. Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition among Local Governments in the Netherlands[J]. International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, 12(4): 493-513.
[19]Baldwin R.E., Krugman P. Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization[J]. European Economic Review, 2004, 48(1):1-23.
[20]Borck R., Pflüger M. Agglomeration and Tax Competition[J]. European Economic Review, 2006, 50(3):647-668.
[21]范子英, 田彬彬. 税收竞争、税收执法与企业避税[J]. 经济研究, 2013, (9): 99-111.
[22]贾俊雪. 税收激励、企业有效平均税率与企业进入[J]. 经济研究, 2014, (7): 94-109.
[23]王凤荣, 苗妙. 税收竞争、区域环境与资本跨区流动——基于企业异地并购视角的实证研究[J]. 经济研究, 2015, (2): 16-30.
[24]郭杰, 王宇澄, 曾博涵. 国家产业政策、地方政府行为与实际税率——理论分析和经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2019, (4): 56-74.
[25]罗鸣令, 范子英, 陈晨. 区域性税收优惠政策的再分配效应——来自西部大开发的证据[J]. 中国工业经济, 2019, (2): 61-79.
[26]付文林, 赵永辉. 税收激励、现金流与企业投资结构偏向[J]. 经济研究, 2014, (5): 19-33.
[27]田彬彬, 王俊杰, 邢思敏. 税收竞争、企业税负与企业绩效——来自断点回归的证据[J]. 华中科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2017, (5): 127-137.
[28]张国庆, 李晓春. 税收竞争、企业投资决策与实体经济振兴[J]. 南京社会科学, 2019, (9): 31-38.
[29]Porcano T. M. Corporate Tax Rates: Progressive, Proportional, or Regressive[J]. Journal of the American Taxation Association, 1986, 7(2):17-31.
[30]Stickney C.P., McGee V.E. Effective Corporate Tax Rates: The Effect of Size, Capital Intensity, Leverage and Other Factors[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1982, 1(2):125-152.
[31]Shevlin T. Taxes and Off-balance-sheet Financing: Research and Development Limited Partnerships[J]. Accounting Review, 1987, 62(3):480-509.
[32]张敏, 刘耀淞, 王欣, 何萱. 企业与税务局为邻: 便利避税还是便利征税?[J]. 管理世界, 2018, (5): 150-164.
[33]赵纯祥, 张敦力, 杨怏, 马光华. 税收征管经历独董能降低企业税负吗[J]. 会计研究, 2019, (11): 70-77.
[34]张军, 高远. 官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2007, (11): 91-103.
[35]刘慧龙, 吴联生. 制度环境、所有权性质与企业实际税率[J]. 管理世界, 2014, (4): 42-52.

Research on Officials' Tax Strategies at the Beginning of Their Tenure: New Evidence Based on DID

官员上任初期的税收策略研究——基于DID的新证据

PDF

Knowledge

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

References

Related Articles 3

Recommended Articles

Metrics

[1]	CHENG Conghui, WANG Jiaxuan. Research on the Influencing Mechanism of Government-guided Funds on New and Old Driving Force Conversion [J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(5): 25-35.
[2]	ZUO Yuehua, LIU Meng, LIU Xiaojun. The Impact of Switching from NEEQ to Higher-level Capital Markets on Corporate Innovation of High-tech Enterprises: Evidence from the Perspective of Financial Constraints [J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(2): 38-47.
[3]	HUANG Guanhua, YE Chengang. Tax Avoidance, Auditor Response and Corporate Financial Reporting Quality——Natural Experiment Based on Accelerated Depreciation [J]. , 2021, 37(5): 82-91.