Abstract: The widespread self-exclusion, marketing exclusion, geographic exclusion, evaluation exclusion, and premium exclusion of farmers growing cotton in Xinjiang cotton insurance has resulted in increased payment pressure for farmers growing cotton, low risk protection levels, weak risk management methods, and insurance compensation that cannot cover the total cost. Drought and pests are not included in the insurance, and the time and proportion of claims have not effectively promoted cotton farmers' replanting. By constructing a game analysis framework for the main players in the cotton insurance market, this paper finds that only the government intervention in the cotton insurance can lead to a balanced solution. At the same time, the operating expenses borne by the insurance company and the insurance premiums that the cotton farmers are willing to bear are lower than the burden of the two parties without government intervention. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt policies guidance to improve the insurance company's protection level for the cotton insurance, formulate differentiated cotton insurance types, timely adjust the claim settlement time and the ratio structure, promote the effective play of the role of the cotton insurance, and stabilize cotton production and cotton farmer's income levels.

Key words: Xinjiang Cotton, Government Intervention, Insurance Exclusion, Cost Sharing

摘要： 新疆棉花保险中广泛存在棉农自我排斥、营销排斥、地理排斥、评估排斥和保费排斥,造成棉农缴费压力增大、风险保障水平偏低、风险管理手段薄弱、保险补偿难以弥补总成本、干旱和病虫害灾未纳入保险、理赔时间和比例未能有效促进棉农补植等问题。通过构建棉花保险市场主体博弈分析框架,发现只有政府介入棉花保险才存在均衡解,同时保险公司承担的经营费用和棉农愿意承担的保费都低于政府未介入时。因此,需要政府介入,通过政策引导来提高棉花保险的保障水平,创新棉花险种,加快理赔速度,以促进棉花保险职能的有效发挥。

关键词: 新疆棉花, 政府介入, 保险排斥, 成本分担