Abstract: Based on the major asset restructuring transactions of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020, this paper studies the impact of M&A restructuring inquiry letter regulation on firms' long-term M&A performance. The research shows that the listed companies receiving the M&A inquiry letter have worse M&A performance 12 months and 24 months after the M&A completion, indicating that inquiry letter regulation has a risk warning effect. The results of the moderating effect test show that the higher the corporate governance level, the higher the M&A performance of the inquired company in 24 months after the completion of the M&A. The more intense the competition in the product market, the worse the M&A performance of the inquired company. Further research finds that, from the perspective of the characteristics of the company's reply letter, the more detailed the company's reply letter, the better the M&A performance in 24 months after the completion of the merger; From the perspective of M&A characteristics, the M&A performance of the questioned companies involved in long-distance M&A is worse.

Key words: Inquiry Letters, M&A Performance, Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance Level

摘要： 本文基于2015年至2020年中国沪深A股上市公司的重大资产重组事件,实证检验并购重组问询函监管对公司长期并购绩效的影响。研究结果表明:被问询公司在并购完成后12个月、24个月的并购绩效较差,说明问询函监管具有风险警示效应。调节效应检验结果显示,公司治理水平越高,被问询公司在并购完成后24个月的并购绩效提升越显著。产品市场竞争越激烈,被问询公司在并购完成后12个月、24个月的并购绩效越差。进一步研究发现,从公司回函特征来看,公司回函越详细,在并购完成后24个月的并购绩效表现越佳;从并购特征来看,涉及异地并购的被问询公司并购绩效更差。

关键词: 问询函监管, 并购绩效, 产品市场竞争, 公司治理水平