Abstract: Against the backdrop of intensifying global trade competition, the global supply chain faces serious risks of disruption and fragmentation. This paper examines the role of government subsidies in enhancing supply chain resilience from three dimensions, whether to subsidize, whom to subsidize, and when to subsidize. Using data from Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2023, the study finds that government subsidies significantly improve the resilience of firms' supply chains, thereby addressing the question of whether to subsidize. Mechanism tests reveal that trade credit provision and supply chain finance strengthen the positive effect of government subsidies; however, due to the presence of soft budget constraints, agency costs and operational risks partially offset this beneficial impact. Further analyses show that subsidies are more effective in stabilizing supply chains when allocated to firms with stronger bargaining power within the supply chain, thereby addressing the question of whom to subsidize. Regarding when to subsidize, the results indicate that during periods of heightened environmental uncertainty, government subsidies can mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on supply chain resilience, making their positive impact more pronounced. Additional analyses demonstrate that government subsidies enhance both domestic and international supply chain resilience; the effectiveness varies across different types of subsidies; participation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and effective subsidy allocation amplify this effect, whereas close government and business relationships weaken the positive impact. This study provides empirical evidence for the shift in government subsidy policies from broad-based allocation to targeted chain-based allocation.

Key words: Government Subsidies, Supply Chain Resilience, Agency Costs, Operational Risk

摘要： 在全球贸易竞争、地缘博弈持续加剧的背景下,全球产业链面临严峻的“卡链”“断链”风险。本文从政府补贴“是否补”“补给谁”“何时补”三个维度出发,基于2010—2023年中国上市企业数据,考察政府补贴对企业供应链韧性的影响。研究发现,企业获得政府补贴能够提升供应链韧性,回答了“是否补”的问题。机制检验发现,商业信用供给和供应链金融能够促进政府补贴的正向作用,但由于预算软约束的存在,企业的代理成本和经营风险会在一定程度上抵消这一正向作用。进一步检验发现,当补贴对象为具有更强供应链话语权的企业时,政府补贴的供应链稳定作用更大,回答了“补给谁”的问题。在“何时补”的问题上,研究发现,当企业面临的环境不确定性冲击较大时,政府补贴能够起到缓冲作用,提升供应链韧性的效果更为显著。进一步分析显示,政府补贴对海内外供应链韧性均具有提升作用,不同类型的补贴对供应链韧性的提升效果存在差异,且加入RCEP以及有效补贴会放大这种提升效果,而政企关系则会削弱其正向作用。本研究为政府补贴从“普惠投放”转向精准支持下的“链式纾困”提供了经验证据。

关键词: 政府补贴, 供应链韧性, 代理成本, 经营风险