Regularized Government Financial and Accounting Supervision and Corporate Audit Fees: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment on the Pilot Reform of Strengthening Financial and Accounting Supervision

Abstract

Abstract: As an integral component of the Party and state supervision system, the impact of financial and accounting supervision on audit fees has not been fully investigated. Utilizing the pilot reform of strengthening financial and accounting supervision as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper takes A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2023 as the research sample to systematically examine the effect of regularized government financial and accounting supervision on corporate audit fees. The findings indicate that regularized government financial and accounting supervision increases corporate audit fees. Mechanism tests reveal that regularized government financial and accounting supervision drives up corporate audit fees through the channels of audit risk perception and audit resource input. Heterogeneity analyses demonstrate that the increasing effect of regularized government financial and accounting supervision on audit fees is more pronounced in firms with poorer internal control quality, lower managerial ownership, and shorter auditor tenure, as well as those audited by non-Big Four firms, and firms located in regions with higher marketization and social trust. Further analysis shows that regularized government financial and accounting supervision can enhance corporate audit quality by increasing audit fees. The findings of this paper provide positive policy implications for improving the construction of China's regularized financial and accounting supervision system to safeguard the stable operation of the capital market.

Key words: Regularized Government Financial and Accounting Supervision, Audit Risk Perception, Audit Resource Input, Audit Fee

摘要： 财会监督作为党和国家监督体系的重要组成部分,其对审计费用的影响尚未得到充分考察。本文基于加强财会监督改革试点这一准自然实验,以2017—2023年A股上市公司作为研究对象,系统考察了政府常态化财会监督对企业审计费用的影响效应。研究发现,政府常态化财务监督提高了企业的审计费用。机制检验发现,政府常态化财会监督通过审计风险感知路径和审计资源投入路径提高了企业的审计费用。异质性检验发现,政府常态化财会监督对企业审计费用的提高效应在内控质量低、管理层持股比例低、审计师任期短、非“四大”审计师以及市场化程度高和社会信任程度高的地区样本企业中更加明显。进一步研究发现,政府常态化财会监督通过提高企业审计费用,能够提升企业审计质量。本文的研究结论对于完善我国常态化财会监督体系建设,保障资本市场稳定运行具有积极的政策启示。

关键词: 常态化财会监督, 审计风险感知, 审计资源投入, 审计费用

CLC Number:

F239.4

HAO Ying, MA Haifang. Regularized Government Financial and Accounting Supervision and Corporate Audit Fees: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment on the Pilot Reform of Strengthening Financial and Accounting Supervision[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2026, 42(9): 88-99.

郝颖, 马海方. 政府常态化财会监督与企业审计费用——来自加强财会监督改革试点的准自然实验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2026, 42(9): 88-99.

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