财经论丛 ›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (6): 106-112.

• 政府管制 • 上一篇    

Stakelberg竞争条件下的药品专利许可问题研究——“医药分离”与“以药养医”两种医疗体制的微观福利比较

刘婵   

  1. 天津财经大学商学院
  • 收稿日期:2013-12-30 修回日期:2014-05-23 出版日期:2015-06-10 发布日期:2015-06-04
  • 通讯作者: 刘婵
  • 基金资助:

    国家社科基金重大项目“世界产业发展新趋势及我国培育发展战略性新兴产业跟踪研究”

The welfare analysis of sole license for pharmaceutical patents in a Stakelberg Structure

  • Received:2013-12-30 Revised:2014-05-23 Online:2015-06-10 Published:2015-06-04

摘要: 借助垂直差异产品的Stakelberg模型,本文分析了“医药分离”和“以药养医”的医疗体制下,专利药企业与仿制药企业达成药品专利排他许可协议的条件以及该许可对患者和医生福利的影响。研究发现:(1)在特定的条件下,与仿制药企业达成专利排他许可协议对专利药企业是有利的;(2)在“医药分离”的医疗体制下,该许可会提升患者的福利水平;在“以药养医”的医疗体制下,该许可会提升医生的福利水平,但是当专利药与仿制药的医保报销比例差距较大且仿制药与专利药的质量差距较大时,该许可会降低患者的福利水平。

Abstract: This paper explores the conditions under which brand-name drug and generic drug manufacturers will reach a sole license agreement for pharmaceutical patents and the influences of this agreements on patients` and doctors` welfare in a vertically differentiated Stakelberg structure. This paper shows that it is beneficial for the brand-name drug manufacturer to reach a sole license agreement under certain conditions. It also shows that this agreement will benefit the doctors, but it will make the patients worse off when the health insurance coverage and the product differentiation between brand-name drug and generic drug are relatively large in the "drug maintaining medicine" system.

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