监督型基金与高管薪酬水平的相关性——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 81-89.

监督型基金与高管薪酬水平的相关性——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

李青原, 张璐琦

武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉 430072

收稿日期:2016-11-15 出版日期:2017-10-10 发布日期:2017-10-10
作者简介:李青原(1977),男,四川内江人,武汉大学经济与管理学院教授(珞珈特聘)
张璐琦(1994),女,山东东营人,武汉大学经济与管理学院硕士生
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272228;71672129)

Monitoring Fund and CEO Compensation——Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies

LI Qingyuan, ZHANG Luqi

School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received:2016-11-15 Online:2017-10-10 Published:2017-10-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以2003~2015年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,考察监督型基金持有对上市公司高管薪酬水平的影响。按照上市公司在基金投资者投资组合中的重要程度来区分基金投资者的监督水平,本文认为只有监督型基金会从监督中获得超过成本的收益,更积极地对公司实行监督,对高管薪酬产生更大影响,帮助公司减轻代理问题。实证研究结果表明:监督型基金持股增加能显著提高高管薪酬水平,同时,通过分组样本回归结果,当公司为国有企业、市场化程度低、存在董事长与总经理两职合一现象时,监督型基金持有与高管薪酬水平的正相关关系更为显著。

关键词: 监督型基金, 高管薪酬水平, 产权性质, 市场化程度, 两职合一

Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the monitoring fund and the CEO compensation based on the data of A-share listed companies selected from 2003 to 2015. We focus on the fraction of the institution's portfolio represented by the firm instead of the fraction of the firm held by institutions.We hold that institutional monitoring will be greater when the target firm represents a significant allocation of funds in the institution's portfolio. Our hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence which shows that the monitoring funds have positive influence on the the level of the CEO compensation. Further analysis finds that the effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises and when the firm is located in the place with a slower marketization process and has CEO duality. This study enriches the literature of insititutional investor and CEO compensation.

Key words: Monitoring Fund, CEO Compensation, Nature of Ownership, Marketization, CEO Duality

中图分类号:

F272.92

李青原, 张璐琦. 监督型基金与高管薪酬水平的相关性——来自A股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(10): 81-89.

LI Qingyuan, ZHANG Luqi. Monitoring Fund and CEO Compensation——Empirical Evidence from A-share Listed Companies[J]. , 2017, 33(10): 81-89.

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