有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究

财经论丛 ›› 2017, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 74-82.

有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究

傅颀¹, 乐婷², 徐静¹

1.浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州 310018
2.中国人民银行慈溪市支行,浙江宁波 315300

收稿日期:2016-10-28 出版日期:2017-09-10 发布日期:2017-09-10
作者简介:傅颀(1979),女,浙江绍兴人,浙江财经大学会计学院教授,博士;乐婷(1991),女,浙江宁波人,中国人民银行慈溪市支行助理经济师;徐静(1982),女,浙江丽水人,浙江财经大学会计学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71502161);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71602179)

Effective Incentives or Abuse of Power for Personal Gain: Executive Excess Compensation and Stock Crash Risk——An Empirical Study Based on the Different Ownership of Companies

Fu Qi¹, Le Ting², Xu Jing¹

1.Accounting School, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China
2. PBC Cixi Branch, Ningbo 315300, China

Received:2016-10-28 Online:2017-09-10 Published:2017-09-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

近年来中国上市公司的高管高薪引起社会的广泛关注。本文搜集了2010~2014年中国A股上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管的超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险的相关关系,分析不同产权性质下高管高薪的激励效果。研究发现:国有上市公司的高管超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险正相关,证明国企中高管高薪的自利性,但该现象仅在地方国企显著;民营上市公司的高管薪酬相对国企而言更具激励性,但激励效果十分有限;超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的关系受产权性质的影响,证明不同产权性质的企业在高管激励方面存在明显差异。本文为不同产权性质上市公司的高管薪酬制度建设提供了理论依据,并同时反映了基于激励动机的股价崩盘效应。

关键词: 产权性质, 超额高管薪酬, 股价崩盘风险

Abstract:

In recent years, executive excesss compensation of listed companies in China has aroused wide attention in the society. Using data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2014, this paper examines the relationship between executive excess compensation and stock crash risk, and analyzes the effect of executive excess compensation in companies with different property rights. The findings are as follows: (1)In state-owned listed companies,executive excess compensation is positively related to stock crash risk, which shows that executive excess compensation is self-interested in state-owned listed companies, but this phenomenon only exists in local state-owned listed companies; (2)In private listed companies, executive excess compensation is more incentive than in state-owned listed companies, but this incentive is very limited; (3)The relationship between executive excess compensation and stock crash risk is affected by the different ownership of companies. This paper provides the theoretical foundation for the construction of executive compensation system in companies with different ownership, and also reflects the stock crash risk effect based on the incentive motivation.

Key words: Property Rights of Companies, Executive Excess Compensation, Stock Crash Risk

中图分类号:

F244

傅颀, 乐婷, 徐静. 有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(9): 74-82.

Fu Qi, Le Ting, Xu Jing. Effective Incentives or Abuse of Power for Personal Gain: Executive Excess Compensation and Stock Crash Risk——An Empirical Study Based on the Different Ownership of Companies[J]. , 2017, 33(9): 74-82.

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