网络媒体、高管薪酬与代理成本

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (3): 63-71.

网络媒体、高管薪酬与代理成本

段升森¹,迟冬梅²,张玉明²

1.齐鲁工业大学山东省科学院工商管理学院,山东济南 250353;
2.山东大学管理学院,山东济南 250100

收稿日期:2018-03-11 出版日期:2019-03-10 发布日期:2019-03-11
作者简介:段升森(1984-),男,山东临沂人,齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院)工商管理学院讲师,博士;迟冬梅(1985-),女,山东潍坊人,山东大学管理学院博士生;张玉明(1962-),男,山东济南人,山东大学管理学院教授,博士。
基金资助:
齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院)人文社科优秀青年学者支持计划(SKRC17-08);山东省社会科学基金青年项目(17DGLJ15)

Network Media, Executive Compensation and Agency Costs

DUAN Shengsen¹, CHI Dongmei², ZHANG Yuming²

1.College of Business Administration, Qilu University of TechnologyShandong Academy of Sciences, Jinan 250353, China;
2.School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China

Received:2018-03-11 Online:2019-03-10 Published:2019-03-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以百度媒体和资讯指数提供的累加检索数据衡量网络媒体关注度,从外部治理视角探讨其对上市公司高管薪酬代理问题的影响。研究发现,我国上市公司高管薪酬与代理成本显著正相关,高管薪酬工具在解决委托代理问题方面并未起到应有的效果。而新兴网络媒体不仅能够积极监督上市公司高管不合理薪酬,而且对高管薪酬代理问题具有显著的外部治理效应,能够有效促进高管薪酬在降低公司代理成本中的作用。本文从委托代理角度为“媒体治理理论”提供了有利证据,也为我国上市公司高管薪酬代理问题的化解及高管薪酬制度的进一步优化提供了理论支持。

关键词: 网络媒体, 高管薪酬, 代理成本, 百度指数

Abstract: From the perspective of the external governance effect, this paper investigates how the network media attention, measured by cumulative retrieval data from Baidu-media-and-information-index, exerts influence on the agency problem of the executive compensation in listed companies. The empirical results indicate that there is a significant positive correlation between the executive compensation and the agency cost in listed companies, which shows that the executive compensation tool has not been effective in solving the principal agent problem. The emerging network media can not only actively supervise the unreasonable compensation of the top executives of listed companies, but also have a significant external governance effect on the agency problem of the executive compensation. From the perspective of principal-agent, this paper provides favorable evidence for the media governance theory, and also provides theoretical support for the resolution of the agency problem of the executive compensation and the further optimization of the executive compensation system in listed companies.

Key words: Network Media Supervision, Executive Compensation, Agency Costs, Baiduindex

中图分类号:

F275.5

段升森,迟冬梅,张玉明. 网络媒体、高管薪酬与代理成本[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(3): 63-71.

DUAN Shengsen, CHI Dongmei, ZHANG Yuming. Network Media, Executive Compensation and Agency Costs[J]. , 2019, 35(3): 63-71.

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