债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向的影响

财经论丛 ›› 2021, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 72-82.

债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向的影响

金龙^1,2, 丁志国¹, 刘欣苗²

1.吉林大学数量经济研究中心,吉林长春 130012;
2.吉林大学商学院,吉林长春 130012

收稿日期:2020-05-27 出版日期:2021-04-10 发布日期:2021-04-13
作者简介:金龙(1988-),男,吉林长春人,吉林大学数量经济研究中心、商学院助理研究员,博士后;丁志国(1968-),男,吉林延吉人,吉林大学数量经济研究中心教授;刘欣苗(1997-),女,吉林长春人,吉林大学商学院硕士生。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目(17BJY183)

The Impact of Debt Default Events on the Preference of Enterprise Investment Structure

JIN Long^1,2, DING Zhiguo¹, LIU Xinmiao²

1. Center of Quantitative Economics Research, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China;
2. Business School, Jilin University, Changchun 130012, China

Received:2020-05-27 Online:2021-04-10 Published:2021-04-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 近年来,在去杠杆进程推进和监管政策收紧背景下,企业的债务违约问题日渐常态化。本文以2001~2017年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向的影响。研究发现,债务违约事件会导致企业投资结构偏向发生变化。债务违约发生后,企业的实体投资显著下降,金融投资显著上升。此外,债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向的影响存在时间趋势效应。债务违约事件对实体投资的负向影响呈逐年衰减的趋势,而对金融投资的正向影响则呈先上升后下降的趋势。最后,不同企业异质性特征下债务违约事件对投资结构偏向的影响不同。民营企业、财务状况较差企业以及竞争行业中企业的投资结构偏向更容易受到债务违约事件的影响。本文的研究结论不仅拓展了债务违约在企业投资决策方面的研究边界,同时揭示了债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向影响的作用机理。

关键词: 债务违约, 投资结构偏向, 实体投资, 金融投资, 时间趋势

Abstract: In recent years, under the background of deleveraging process and tightening regulatory policies, the problem of corporate debt default has become more and more common. This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2017 as research samples to investigate the impact of debt default events on the preference of enterprise investment structure. It is found that debt default events do lead to the change in preference of enterprise investment structure. After the occurrence of the debt default, the physical investment of enterprises significantly decreases and the financial investment significantly increases. In addition, the debt default event has a time trend effect on the preference of enterprise investment structure. The negative impact of debt default events on the physical investment decreases by years, while the positive impact on the financial investment first increases and then decreases. Finally, the impact of debt default events on the preference of enterprise investment structure varies with different enterprise heterogeneity. The preference of investment structure of private enterprises, enterprises with poor financial status and enterprises in competitive industries are more vulnerable to debt default events. The conclusion of this paper not only expands the research boundary of debt default in the investment decision of enterprises, but also reveals the mechanism of the influence of debt default on the preference of enterprise investment structure.

Key words: Debt Default, Preference of Investment Structure, Physical Investment, Financial Investment, Time Trends

中图分类号:

F275

金龙, 丁志国, 刘欣苗. 债务违约事件对企业投资结构偏向的影响[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(4): 72-82.

JIN Long, DING Zhiguo, LIU Xinmiao. The Impact of Debt Default Events on the Preference of Enterprise Investment Structure[J]. , 2021, 37(4): 72-82.

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