网络平台互动与审计定价:言多必失？

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 伴随着信息技术的快速发展,网络互动平台已成为加强市场参与者之间信息沟通的重要工具。不同于现有文献着重强调网络平台互动的“信息效率提升效应”,本文基于代理理论分析管理层私利动机下的网络平台互动对审计师定价决策的影响。从2010至2020年企业在“互动易”和“上证e互动”平台答复投资者提问的现实表现出发,检验结果发现,企业与投资者更高的互动频次和更多的互动内容均会显著提升审计费用,且这种效应主要存在于民营企业。有关作用机制的检验发现,更多的网络平台互动对企业信息透明度产生了不利影响,具体表现为降低了分析师盈余预测的精确度并为企业带来了显著更高的股价崩盘风险。上述结论为不规范的网络平台互动可能引发的消极效应提供了实证证据,拓展了有关审计定价影响因素和互联网沟通经济后果的研究,对进一步完善市场参与主体之间的网络互动机制具有重要的现实启示。

关键词: 网络平台互动, 审计定价, 产权性质, 信息环境

Abstract: With the rapid development of information technology, the online interactive platform has become an important tool to strengthen information communication among market participants. Through the online interactive platform, investors with questions can directly ask listed companies about the content that they pay attention to, so as to get the reply and explanation from the company's management in time. Other investors can also browse the above-mentioned questions and answers in an open way. The regulator is responsible for supervising the operation of the interactive platform. In theory, the online platform interaction is helpful for improving the market information efficiency on the basis of better meeting the unique information needs of market participants. However, in practice, the company frequently uses the interactive platform to manipulate information disclosure through newsjaking, which poses challenges to the “information efficiency improvement effect” of online platform interaction. In this context, this paper intends to analyze the possible impact of online platform interaction on enterprise information environment from the perspective of auditor pricing.
According to the agency theory, managers may manipulate the information disclosure with the help of interactive platforms in order to seek personal interests. Using data of China's A-share non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2020, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of online platform interaction on auditor pricing and its heterogeneity. The results show that auditors charge higher fees on enterprises which have higher interaction frequency and more interaction content with investors, and this effect mainly exists in private enterprises. Further tests find that online platform interaction has exacerbated the stock price crash risk and reduced the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecast. These findings show that impairing information transparency is an important mechanism for the online platform interaction to increase audit fees.
The above conclusions indicate that the online platform interaction under the current practice framework has had a certain negative impact on the enterprise information environment, thus providing a new explanation for the influencing factors of audit pricing from the perspective of online communication. At the same time, focusing on the auditor which is an important participant in the capital market, this paper reveals the negative effect of online platform interaction on audit pricing and its heterogeneity under the manager's self-interest motive from the perspective of the agency theory, so as to expand the research on the economic effects of internet communication and have important practical implications for further improving the online interaction mechanism between market participants.

Key words: Online Platform Interaction, Audit Pricing, Property Right Nature, Information Environment

中图分类号:

F239.43

李文贵, 陈钰涵, 路军. 网络平台互动与审计定价:言多必失？[J]. 财经论丛, 2023, 39(6): 58-68.

LI Wengui, CHEN Yuhan, LU Jun. Online Platform Interaction and Audit Pricing: Talks Much Errs Much?[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(6): 58-68.

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