证监会随机抽查与实体企业金融化

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 避免宏观经济和微观实体企业“脱实向虚”有助于推动资本市场更好服务实体经济,促进高质量发展。本文以2009—2021年中国沪深A股上市企业为实证研究样本,手工收集整理证监会随机抽查企业样本,采用多期动态DID研究方法考察随机抽查制度对企业金融化的主要影响及其内在传导机理,验证“有为政府”背景下政府监管与治理的重要作用。研究结果表明:第一,证监会随机抽查显著抑制企业金融化,且该抑制效应存在一定程度的滞后性;第二,证监会随机抽查对企业金融化的抑制效应主要存在强化企业研发投入、提升企业风险承担能力和降低企业代理成本等三种作用路径;第三,考虑“有为政府”下的“有效市场”效应,企业ESG在证监会随机抽查与企业金融化之间产生负向调节作用,说明企业ESG作为市场意义上的可持续发展战略导向,能够替代随机抽查制度对企业金融化的抑制效应;第四,证监会随机抽查对企业金融化的抑制效应在东部地区、民营产权、高管金融背景和监管强度更大地区的企业中更为明显。

关键词: 随机抽查制度, 研发激励, 代理成本, 企业金融化, ESG

Abstract: The effective support of high-quality development is to guide financial capital to serve the real economy and avoid the macro-economy financialization and corporate financialization; meanwhile, exploring the circumvention factors of financialization of listed companies in the capital market will help promote the capital market to better serve the real economy and promote high-quality development. This paper takes China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2021 as empirical research samples, adopts multi-period dynamic DID research method to investigate the main impact of CSRC's random inspection system on corporate financialization and its internal transmission mechanism, and verifies the important role of government supervision and governance in the context of government. The research results show that, first, the CSRC's random inspection significantly inhibits the corporate financialization, and the research conclusion is still valid based on parallel trend test and robustness test, and the inhibition effect has a lag to a certain extent. Second, the inhibitory effect of CSRC's random check on corporate financialization is mainly achieved through strengthening corporate R&D efforts, increasing corporate' risk taking and reducing corporate agency costs. R&D investment, risk taking and agency costs play partial intermediary roles between CSRC's random check and corporate financialization. Third, considering the “efficient market” effect under “proactive government”, firm ESG has a negative regulating effect between random check and firm financialization, indicating that firm ESG, as a sustainable development orientation in the market sense, can replace the inhibiting effect of firm financialization under random check system. Fourth, the regulatory and governance effects of CSRC random check on corporate financialization are heterogeneous, showing that the inhibitory effect of random check on corporate financialization is more obvious in the eastern regions, private property rights, corporates with financial background of senior executives and regions with stronger regulatory intensity.

Key words: Random Inspection System, R&D Incentives, Agency Cost, Corporate Financialization, ESG

中图分类号:

F273.1

阳镇, 王越, 凌鸿程. 证监会随机抽查与实体企业金融化[J]. 财经论丛, 2025, 41(11): 43-53.

YANG Zhen, WANG Yue, LING Hongcheng. CSRC's Random Inspections and Enterprise Financialization[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2025, 41(11): 43-53.

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