Abstract: Board network is a set system constructed by interlocking directorates who hold a post of two or more listed companies. The network location can affect the governance role of directors in China. Depend on the resource dependent theory, we use social network analysis methods to empirical the relationship of directors’ governance on the management compensation sensitivity. We document that: board network centrality can enhance the management compensation sensitivity; further study found that this effect is interference by corporate control power. This discovery enriches empirical literature about “social network and corporate governance”, and provides better understanding in the governance role of directors.

摘要： 董事网络是同时在两家以上公司担任职务的连锁董事形成的集合，董事在董事网络中的位置能够影响其治理效果。本研究利用社会网络分析方法实证检验了董事的网络位置与管理层薪酬及其激励有效性的关系，研究发现：公司董事网络中心度会显著增强管理层薪酬及其业绩敏感性；进一步研究显示，不同公司控制权背景会对董事网络的治理效果产生影响。