连锁董事网络与企业动态创新能力——基于多重治理情境的调节作用

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在中国经济转型背景下,连锁董事网络作为非正式制度的体现和社会资本的载体,是企业获取外部资源的重要途径。连锁董事网络位置体现了网络权力,会通过机会感知、资源整合和知识吸收效应进而影响企业创新能力。本文拓展了创新能力的动态维度,运用社会网络分析方法,以2009—2018年中国A股上市公司数据为样本,实证研究连锁董事网络位置对企业动态创新能力的差异化作用机制,并探讨治理情境对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,连锁董事网络中心度对创新投入能力、创新产出能力、创新转化能力均有显著影响;结构洞对创新投入能力有显著影响,而对创新产出能力和创新转化能力的影响不显著;连锁董事网络位置与动态创新能力之间的关系会受到多重治理因素调节效应的差异化影响。本文的理论分析拓展了连锁董事网络和动态创新能力的相关研究,可以为中国企业动态创新、公司治理制度安排和连锁董事网络构建提供借鉴。

关键词: 连锁董事网络, 动态创新能力, 多重治理情境, 网络中心度, 结构洞

Abstract:

As the embodiment of informal institution and the carrier of social capital, the interlocking directorate network is an important means for enterprises to obtain resources under the background of China’s transition economies. The interlocking directorate network location is quantification of the network power, so the network location can affect enterprises’ innovation through the opportunity perception, the resources integration and the knowledge absorption effect. Based on the social network analysis method, this study expands the dynamic dimensions of innovation and empirically examines the differentiated effect mechanism of the interlocking directorate network location on innovation and the moderating effect of the multiple governance situation by using the Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as research samples.
This study finds that each dimension of the dynamic innovation capability is affected by different factors of the interlocking directorate network location. Specifically, the innovation input capability is affected by the degree centrality, the closeness centrality, the betweenness centrality and the structural hole; the innovation output capability and the transformation capability are affected by the degree centrality and the closeness centrality; the betweenness centrality and the structural hole are positively correlated with the innovation input capability, but have no significant effect on the innovation output capability and the transformation capability; there are differences in the function boundary of the interlocking directorate network on the dynamic innovation capability; the duality positively moderates the relation between the centrality, the structural hole and the dynamic innovation capability; the executive incentive and the property rights positively moderate the relationship between the centrality and the dynamic innovation capability, but have no significant moderating effect on the relationship between the structural hole and the innovation output and transformation capabilities.
The research conclusion shows that the dynamic innovation capability is differentially affected by the interlocking directorate network location, and the moderating effects of the multiple governance situation are also different. The reason is that the betweenness centrality and the structural hole can be seen as indirect ties and are more potential and implicit than the degree centrality and the closeness centrality, so only when identified effectively can they be brought into full play. While concurrently serving as the general manager, the board director can have better “boundary spanner” effect, thus promoting the innovation effect of the interlocking directorate network. As a consequence, the duality has a moderating effect with a wide range.
The contributions of this study are as follows: First, explaining the connotation and the dimension of innovation from the dynamic perspective, it deconstructs the dynamic innovation capability into the innovation input, output and transformation capabilities, which enriches the dynamic analysis based on the dynamic capability theory, the innovation theory and the organizational learning theory. Second, it analyzes the differential mechanism of the interlocking directorate network location, and identifies the key influencing factors of the dynamic innovation capability, which can deepen the research of the interlocking directorate network innovation effect. In addition, through exploring the multiple governance situation, it clarifies the function condition and boundary. The conclusions can provide references for Chinese enterprises’ dynamic innovation, corporate governance and construction of the interlocking directorate network.

Key words: Interlocking Directorate Network, Dynamic Innovation Capability, Multiple Governance Situation, Network Centrality, Structural Hole

中图分类号:

F270.3

郑方, 单文涛, 王永青. 连锁董事网络与企业动态创新能力——基于多重治理情境的调节作用[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(11): 77-88.

ZHENG Fang, SHAN Wentao, WANG Yongqing. Interlocking Directorate Network and Dynamic Innovation Capability: Based on Moderating Effect of Multiple Governance Situation[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2021, 37(11): 77-88.

图/表 6

参考文献 34

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类别	名称	符号	计算方法
解释变量	董事网络中心度	Degree	程度中心度,具体公式见上文
	董事网络结构洞	Closeness	接近中心度,具体公式见上文
		Betweenness	中介中心度,具体公式见上文
		Ci	具体公式见上文
被解释变量	企业动态创新	DIC-i	创新投入,公司年末披露的研发费用/年末披露的总资产
		DIC-o	创新产出,(本期主营业务收入-上期主营业务收入)/上期主营业务收入
		DIC-t	创新转化,公司年末披露的无形资产/年末批露的总资产
调节变量	治理情境	Inc	高管激励,高管持股数量与总股本的比值
		Pro	产权性质,最终控制人为国有股东取值为1,否则为0
		Du	两职合一,董事长与总经理兼任赋值1,否则为0
控制变量	公司规模	Size	期末资产总额的自然对数
	成长性	Growth	总资产增长率=(期末总资产-期初总资产)/期初总资产
	财务杠杆	Lever	公司年末披露的负债总额与资产总额的比值
	年度	Year	所在年度
	行业	Industry	所属行业

类别	名称	符号	计算方法
解释变量	董事网络中心度	Degree	程度中心度,具体公式见上文
	董事网络结构洞	Closeness	接近中心度,具体公式见上文
		Betweenness	中介中心度,具体公式见上文
		Ci	具体公式见上文
被解释变量	企业动态创新	DIC-i	创新投入,公司年末披露的研发费用/年末披露的总资产
		DIC-o	创新产出,(本期主营业务收入-上期主营业务收入)/上期主营业务收入
		DIC-t	创新转化,公司年末披露的无形资产/年末批露的总资产
调节变量	治理情境	Inc	高管激励,高管持股数量与总股本的比值
		Pro	产权性质,最终控制人为国有股东取值为1,否则为0
		Du	两职合一,董事长与总经理兼任赋值1,否则为0
控制变量	公司规模	Size	期末资产总额的自然对数
	成长性	Growth	总资产增长率=(期末总资产-期初总资产)/期初总资产
	财务杠杆	Lever	公司年末披露的负债总额与资产总额的比值
	年度	Year	所在年度
	行业	Industry	所属行业

变量	N	均值	标准差	最小值	P25	P50	P75	最大值
Degree	13618	0.0332	0.0598	0.0002	0.0004	0.0005	0.002	0.185
Closeness	13618	0.0885	0.0641	0.0002	0.0007	0.119	0.140	0.176
Betweenness	13618	0.0006	0.0015	0	0	0	0.0005	0.023
Ci	13618	0.604	0.189	0.131	0.465	0.628	0.733	0.916
DIC-i	13618	0.0211	0.0196	0	0.0086	0.0177	0.0279	0.273
DIC-o	13618	0.184	0.621	-0.956	0.0033	0.127	0.281	53.08
DIC-t	13618	0.0463	0.0507	0	0.0195	0.0352	0.0562	0.713
Inc	13618	0.0905	0.156	0	0	0.0047	0.113	0.843
Pro	13618	0.310	0.463	0	0	0	1	1
Du	13618	0.290	0.454	0	0	0	1	1
Size	13618	9.507	0.550	8.392	9.117	9.434	9.815	11.25
Growth	13618	0.251	0.466	-0.237	0.0307	0.116	0.267	2.827
Lever	13618	0.39	0.199	0.0438	0.227	0.382	0.542	0.84

变量	N	均值	标准差	最小值	P25	P50	P75	最大值
Degree	13618	0.0332	0.0598	0.0002	0.0004	0.0005	0.002	0.185
Closeness	13618	0.0885	0.0641	0.0002	0.0007	0.119	0.140	0.176
Betweenness	13618	0.0006	0.0015	0	0	0	0.0005	0.023
Ci	13618	0.604	0.189	0.131	0.465	0.628	0.733	0.916
DIC-i	13618	0.0211	0.0196	0	0.0086	0.0177	0.0279	0.273
DIC-o	13618	0.184	0.621	-0.956	0.0033	0.127	0.281	53.08
DIC-t	13618	0.0463	0.0507	0	0.0195	0.0352	0.0562	0.713
Inc	13618	0.0905	0.156	0	0	0.0047	0.113	0.843
Pro	13618	0.310	0.463	0	0	0	1	1
Du	13618	0.290	0.454	0	0	0	1	1
Size	13618	9.507	0.550	8.392	9.117	9.434	9.815	11.25
Growth	13618	0.251	0.466	-0.237	0.0307	0.116	0.267	2.827
Lever	13618	0.39	0.199	0.0438	0.227	0.382	0.542	0.84

变量		(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)	(12)
变量		DIC-i		DIC-i		DIC-i		DIC-i		DIC-o		DIC-o		DIC-o		DIC-o		DIC-t		DIC-t		DIC-t	DIC-t
Degree		0.021^**								0.001^*								0.004^**
		(2.05)								(1.92)								(2.38)
Closeness				0.036^***								0.001^***								0.002^*
				(3.15)								(2.70)								(1.77)
Betweenness						0.287^***								0.002								0.004
						(2.88)								(0.77)								(0.12)
Ci								0.005^***								0.001							0.001
								(4.29)								(0.88)							(1.14)
Size		0.004^***		0.004^***		0.004^***		0.004^***		0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001^**		0.001^**		0.001^**	0.001^**
Growth		-0.003^***		-0.003^***		-0.003^***		-0.003^***		0.001^***		0.001^***		0.001^***		0.001^***		-0.004^***		-0.004^***		-0.004^***	-0.004^***
		(-9.87)		(-9.41)		(-9.19)		(-9.36)		(2.90)		(2.91)		(2.92)		(2.91)		(-4.11)		(-4.13)		(-4.11)	(-4.13)
变量		(1)	(2)		(3)		(4)			(5)	(6)		(7)		(8)			(9)	(10)		(11)		(12)
变量		DIC-i	DIC-i		DIC-i		DIC-i			DIC-o	DIC-o		DIC-o		DIC-o			DIC-t	DIC-t		DIC-t		DIC-t
Lever		-0.009^***	-0.009^***		-0.009^***		-0.009^***			-0.002^**	-0.002^***		-0.002^***		-0.002^***			0.001^***	0.001^***		0.001^***		0.001^***
Lever		(-9.40)	(-9.05)		(-9.11)		(-9.09)			(-2.54)	(-2.63)		(-2.65)		(-2.60)			(4.98)	(4.99)		(4.92)		(4.87)
年度	控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制
行业	控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制		控制
_cons	0.045^***		0.044^***		0.043^***		0.042^***		-0.001^**		-0.001^**		-0.001^**		-0.001^**		0.002^**		0.002^***		0.002^***		0.002^***
	(13.33)		(13.20)		(13.23)		(13.40)		(-2.12)		(-2.18)		(-2.18)		(-2.33)		(2.53)		(2.73)		(2.68)		(2.84)
N	13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618		13618
R²_a	0.234		0.235		0.230		0.231		0.167		0.168		0.165		0.162		0.11		0.12		0.11		0.12
F	287.87		284.96		286.40		288.28		21.103		20.164		20.141		20.230		36.060		36.855		36.025		36.869